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Abstract 
The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), established in 1863, is the United States’ leading 
science and technology think-tank, with an active commitment to advising government. Over 
the last 150 years, the NAS has, both independently and in conjunction with the federal gov-
ernment, investigated and reported on various issues of importance, ranging from space ex-
ploration and biosecurity, to STEM education and immigration. Due to growing concerns 
about particular disciplines (and specifically their application in legal proceedings), one issue 
the NAS has reported on between 1992 and 2009 is forensic science. Specifically, the NAS 
has published six reports commenting on the status of forensic science evidence in the USA, 
namely DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992), The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evi-
dence (1996), The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003), Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet 
Lead Evidence (2004), Ballistic Imaging (2008), and Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward (2009). The response of stakeholders (including from politi-
cal, legal, and academic spheres) to these reports has varied, ranging from shifts in practice 
and full acknowledgement, to considerable struggles to effectuate systemic reform. Using the 
different experiences of two reports - Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence 
(2004) and Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) - as 
a vehicle, this article suggests how the NAS can strengthen the impact of its forensic science 
reporting, and how stakeholders can better harness the expertise of the NAS. 

Introduction 
DNA technology – when applied properly - provides the criminal justice system with a highly 
reliable identification method, which can be used to both convict and exonerate individuals. 
At the same time, however, this quality, undermines various forensic science identification 
techniques, including tool-mark, fingerprint, and bite-mark analysis, which the criminal 
justice system has routinely admitted as evidence for decades.  The federal government and 1
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) – the United States' leading science and technology 
think-tank - have recognized this.  In 1992 and 1996, following the introduction of DNA 
evidence into legal proceedings,  the NAS, supported by federal funding,  published two re2 3 -
ports on the forensic use of DNA technology. In these reports, the NAS encouraged the crim-
inal justice system to harness DNA technology - when conducted according to approved pro-
cedures - due to its evidence-based high reliability.  Subsequently, federal bodies commis4 -
sioned the NAS to report on the probative value of other, non-DNA forensic science tech-
niques.  This resulted in the publication of four reports: The Polygraph and Lie Detection – 5
2003 ; Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence – 2004 ; Ballistic Imaging – 2008 ; 6 7 8
and Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward – 2009.  Generally, 9
these reports provide an examination of the reliability and validity of the relevant forensic 
science discipline(s), and include recommendations to the commissioning body. The response 
of stakeholders to these reports has varied, ranging from shifts in practice, and clear acknow-
ledgements, to silence and considerable struggle to effectuate systemic forensic science re-
form.  
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This article, using the experiences of Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence 
(CBLA Report) and Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
(Strengthening) as a vehicle, explores how the NAS can strengthen the impact of its forensic 
science reporting, and, how stakeholders can better harness the expertise of the NAS in this 
context. These reports have been selected because of the clearly identifiable and diverse spec-
trum of responses they have drawn. Part I briefly outlines the function and research portfolio 
of the NAS and details the circumstances surrounding the publication of both the CBLA Re-
port and Strengthening. This includes the findings of those reports and stakeholder responses 
to/associated with the reports, including those by the FBI, Department of Justice, Congress, 
the judiciary, state legislatures, and the White House. Part II identifies themes in the experi-
ences of these reports, using them to shape a template that can – the authors suggest - be used 
to strengthen the NAS’ forensic science reporting and enable stakeholders to better harness 
the expertise of the NAS. Part III concludes that the template with enable the NAS to take a 
lead role in increasing public confidence in the criminal justice system by facilitating cross-
stakeholder collaboration, and by publicly normalizing and explaining the nature of the sci-
entific method, progress, findings, and uncertainty. This role aligns neatly with the NAS’ 
unique history, function, and mission.  
PART I: THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND SELECTED REPORTS 
ON FORENSIC SCIENCE 
This section first outlines the history and function of the NAS. It then details the circum-
stances surrounding the publication of the CBLA Report and Strengthening, including the 
findings of those reports and the responses drawn from stakeholders. 
a. Function and Research Portfolio of the NAS 
In 1863, the NAS was established by President Lincoln to provide “independent, objective 
advice to the nation on matters related to science and technology.”  The NAS is now consid10 -
ered to be the United States’ premier scientific research center, with a statutory mandate to 
“… report upon any subject of science…” when called upon by the federal government.  It is 11
a “private, non-profit society of distinguished scholars,”  with its members elected by their 12
peers “for outstanding contributions to research.”  The NAS’ Mission Statement states it is 13
“committed to furthering science in America” , although its members are also notably “ac14 -
tive contributors to the international scientific community.”   15
Over the last 150 years, the NAS has generated a diverse portfolio of research that reflects the 
culture of scientific collaboration and inquiry. This portfolio includes reporting on matters of 
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national security and welfare during World War I;  exploring warfare technology in World 16
War II;  mapping side effects of atomic warfare and participating in international scientific 17
exchanges  during the Cold War ; and, more recently, reporting on education, population 18 19
growth, climate change, and forensic science.  During this time, the NAS has experienced 20
evolving, challenging and productive relationships with various stakeholders, including the 
federal government, states, and scholars.  This article focuses on stakeholder responses to 21
two of the NAS’s forensic science reports, namely the CBLA report and Strengthening. Sub-
section (b) provides relevant details about these reports. 
b. The CBLA Report and Strengthening:  Report Overviews and Stakeholder Re-
sponses  
Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence (CBLA Report) 
In the mid-twentieth century, Comparative Bullet-Lead Analysis (CBLA) was developed by 
the FBI as a tool to determine the source of bullet fragments found at crime scenes.  The 22
technique, exclusively used by the FBI,  involves examiners comparing the chemical com23 -
position of a bullet fragment to suspect-related bullets.  Typically, examiners analyze the ra24 -
tio between seven chemical elements, and find a match if the chemical make-up of the two 
samples are sufficiently similar.  25
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A NATIONAL RESOURCE: II – INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH 365 (1940).
 Id. at 396-397.17
 The government also made use of the NAS through a series of scientific exchanges between both the USSR and China. 18
This proved to be valuable for international relations, with science maintaining dialogue between nations when political 
relations had broken down.
 During the Cold War period, the NAS and NRC worked on a variety of research projects for the federal government, in19 -
cluding oceanography, studies of pacific islands and improving international scientific dialogue and cooperation. As popular 
interest in subjects such as the effect of atomic warfare increased, the NAS was used by the federal government to map its 
effects.  
 See, e.g., GEORGE B. KISTIAKOWSKY, FEDERAL SUPPORT OF BASIC RESEARCH IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING 20
(1964); WILLIAM D. MCELROY, THE GROWTH OF WORLD POPULATION: ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR RESEARCH AND TRAINING (1963).
 For example, the report, ALAN LESHNER, COMMUNICATING SCIENCE EFFECTIVELY (2017) was funded by a collection of 21
private organizations, namely the Burroughs Wellcome Fund, the Rita Allen Foundation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foun-
dation, and the Hewlett Foundation.
 KENNETH O. MACFADDEN ET AL, supra note 7, at 1.22
 William C. Thompson, Analyzing the Relevance and Admissibility of Bullet-Lead Evidence: Did the NRC Report Miss the 23
Target, 46 JURIMETRICS 65, 66 (2005-2006).
 KENNETH O. MACFADDEN ET AL, supra note 7, at 8, 19-20.24
 Id.25
In 2002, the FBI commissioned the NAS to produce “an impartial scientific assessment of the 
soundness of the scientific principles underlying CBLA  to determine the optimum manner 26
for conducting the examination and to establish scientifically valid conclusions.”  This fol27 -
lowed publication of the concerns of former FBI metallurgist, William Tobin, about the sci-
entific basis for CBLA.  This was the first time that CBLA evidence had received such scru28 -
tiny.   29
In 2004, the NAS published its report Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence. 
The report detailed the analytical method used by FBI examiners,  and criticized much of the 30
FBI’s reporting procedures for incompleteness and lack of detail.   Despite this, it recog31 -
nized the FBI process as appropriate for determining the chemical composition of bullet 
lead.   It discussed several methods for the statistical analysis of CBLA evidence, including 32
error rates.  The NAS found that the methods used by the FBI insufficiently appreciated the 33
variability of bullets, both within the bullet population and differences in manufacturing pro-
cesses.  The report concluded and recommended to the FBI that the statistical procedures 34
used to assess a match should employ standard deviations and be charted regularly. It also 
recommended that all examiners follow official FBI protocol(s) for CBLA, including proper-
ly maintaining documentation.   35
The NAS also found that variations in manufacturing processes could undermine the proba-
tive value of CBLA evidence and potentially result in misleading comparisons.  It recom36 -
mended that further research be carried out to define different ranges of indistinguishable 
lead.  The NAS also identified issues relating to the interpretation of CBLA evidence.  This 37 38
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led them to recommend a more rigorous analysis process,  and to caution the FBI that its an39 -
alytical protocol needed revision to provide more clarity.  The NAS, however, did not rec40 -
ommend that CBLA evidence be inadmissible in legal proceedings.  41
Stakeholder Responses 
This report primarily elicited responses from two stakeholder groups: the FBI and the judicia-
ry. 
FBI Response 
Immediately after the report’s publication, the FBI defended its use of CBLA, but expressed a 
willingness to undertake further research.  However, in September 2005, the FBI published a 42
press release stating that “after extensive study and consideration,”  it would “no longer 43
conduct the examination of bullet lead.”  The FBI stated that it “firmly support[s] the scien44 -
tific foundation”  of CBLA, but decided to discontinue CBLA due to costs associated with 45
improvements, and that “neither scientists nor bullet manufacturers are able to definitely at-
test to the significance of an association…in the course of a bullet lead examination.  46
At the time of the FBI’s decision, over 2,500 convictions had been secured using the CBLA 
technique.  This attracted media attention (including from 60 Minutes and the Washington 47
Post) , which urged the FBI to review relevant convictions.  Ultimately, the FBI partnered 48 49
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with the Innocence Project, and Department of Justice to conduct such a review.   There is 50
limited information available about outcome of this review.   51
Judicial Response 
The CBLA Report has also been referenced in judicial decisions. Individuals have appealed 
convictions (with or without a FBI review letter)  on the basis that the CBLA Report consti52 -
tutes newly discovered evidence.  
Newly discovered evidence claims “usually involve some combination of showings that the 
new evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence; that the evidence is relevant and not cumulative or merely impeaching; and that the 
new evidence creates a sufficient probability of a different result at a new trial.”   Petitioners 53
have used this mechanism to argue that the CBLA report is new evidence capable of under-
mining the trial result. 
Some petitions have succeeded in cases where CBLA evidence was the primary evidence 
against the petitioner. For example, in Ward v State, the Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land held that various pieces of evidence coming to light after trial (including the NAS re-
port) constituted newly discovered evidence and vacated the petitioner’s conviction.  Simi54 -
larly, in Murphy v State the court also agreed that the NAS report constituted newly discov-
ered evidence, as the report’s findings were not discoverable at trial, leading the court to re-
verse the conviction.   55
By contrast, other courts have determined that the CBLA Report is not newly discovered evi-
dence. This has been for various reasons, including that CBLA’s loss of ‘general acceptance’ 
neither affects previous decisions in the case,  nor renders trials fundamentally unfair.  An56 57 -
other reason is the court’s conclusion that in the individual case the limitations of CBLA had 
been  brought to the jury’s attention during cross-examination.  In More v State, for exam58 -
ple, the Supreme Court of Iowa recognized the report as a “blockbuster” constituting newly 
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discovered evidence,  but did not find fundamental unfairness in the trial, as the defendant 59
did not suffer actual prejudice.  Similarly, the Kentucky Supreme Court in St Clair v Com60 -
monwealth, determined that although CBLA evidence is no longer admissible, it does not go 
so far as to justify a new trial, as the CBLA expert conceded that the evidence was not infalli-
ble.   61
Another identifiable approach in rejecting newly discovered evidence claims emerges where 
a conviction was supported by other, non-CBLA evidence. In such cases, judges have rea-
soned that, due to the presence of other inculpatory evidence, the exclusion or undermining 
of CBLA evidence would not have resulted in a different trial outcome.  For example, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota dismissed the petitioner’s claim in Gassler v State, deciding 
that the additional evidence presented to the jury at trial meant that removing CBLA evidence 
would have no effect on the jury’s decision.   62
2.  Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 
In 2005, Congress commissioned the NAS to report on the general status of forensic science 
after recognizing that “significant improvements are needed in forensic science.”  The report 63
aimed to “chart an agenda for progress in the forensic science community and its scientific 
disciplines.”  To do this, the NAS engaged in a comprehensive consultation with stakehold64 -
ers and experts.  The evidence received by the NAS was “detailed, complex, and sometimes 65
controversial.”  In its report, therefore, the NAS decided to “reach a consensus on the most 66
important issues,” and offer specific recommendations for them.   67
Strengthening was published in 2009, reporting on forensics in general and on individual 
forensic science disciplines in particular.  The overall finding of the report was that the foren-
sic science sector was fragmented and under-resourced,  which limited its potential to effec68 -
tively service stakeholders.  The NAS recommended that  Congress create an independent 69
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oversight body to monitor the implementation of the report’s recommendations,  which were 70
designed to improve  adherence to standards and provide forensic science education.  71
With regards to specific disciplines, the report evaluated each discipline’s  adherence to fun-
damental scientific principles.  This included: biological evidence;  drug and controlled 72 73
substance analysis;  friction ridge analysis (fingerprints);  other pattern and impression 74 75
evidence;  toolmark and firearms identification evidence;  microscopic hair evidence;  76 77 78
fiber evidence;  document examination ;  paint and coatings evidence;  explosives evid79 80 81 -
ence and fire debris;  forensic odontology (bite impressions);  bloodstain pattern analysis;  82 83 84
 Id. at 80.70
 Id. at 217.71
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reliable way of attributing fluids to individuals, but other DNA analysis methods are available. As DNA developed through 
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 The report did not find any scientifically accepted statistics about frequency distribution of hair characteristics, and ana78 -
lysts’ conclusions are often inaccurate, calling testimony “highly unreliable.” Id. at 155-161.
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carried out. Id. at 163-167.
 While based on solid foundation of chemistry, the report showed concerns about the lack of standard practices for deter81 -
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 The report supported the chemistry-based foundations of explosives evidence, but found very little research into burn 82
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 The reliability of bite mark evidence was refuted, with the report rejecting the methods used by analysts to identify indi83 -
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173-176.
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and digital and multimedia analysis.  The NAS found that these techniques varied in their 85
reliability and underpinning research,  and that several techniques “do not contribute as 86
much to criminal justice as they could.”  Ultimately, the NAS concluded that “with the ex87 -
ception of nuclear DNA analysis… no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have 
the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection 
between evidence and a specific individual or source.”  This was hailed as a landmark and 88
unprecedented conclusion.  89
Although the NAS did not make prescriptive comments on the admissibility of forensic tech-
niques, it discussed what it saws as inadequacies in legal admissibility standards.  Its find90 -
ings were particularly critical of judicial decision-making under Daubert,  which requires 91
judges – as part of their gate-keeping role - to consider error-rates, professional standards, 
general acceptance, testability, and peer review of disciplines to determine the admissibility 
of expert evidence. The NAS stated, that “the present situation… is seriously wanting”  and 92
that “Daubert has done little to improve the use of forensic science evidence in criminal 
cases.”    93
Stakeholder Responses 
Ten years post-publication, a significant body of literature discussing Strengthening exists.  94
Most recently, co-chairs of the committee that authored Strengthening, Harry T. Edwards and 
Constantine Gatsonis, were awarded the Innocence Network's 2018 Champion of Justice 
Award. The Innocence Project thanked the committee for the report, stating it "has truly 
transformed the state of forensic science and the involvement of the research community in 
service of criminal justice reform.”  Over the last decade, the critical messages of Strength95 -
ening have attracted various stakeholder responses, including from Congress, state legisla-
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tures, the judiciary, the Department of Justice, FBI, and White House. These are summarised 
below. 
Congress 
The report’s recommendations, including the creation of the oversight body - nominally 
called the National Institute of Forensic Science - were naturally directed towards Congress. 
In 2009, the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology discussed how 
Strengthening’s findings and recommendations would relate to the work of the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology.  The Senate Judiciary Committee discussed the report’s 96
findings in the light of a 2009 United States Supreme Court decision – Melendez-Diaz v 
Massachusetts.  In that case the Court had, citing Strengthening, commented that forensic 97
science was subject to “serious deficiencies.”  Noting this comment, the Senate Judiciary 98
Committee took evidence from various stakeholders, including the Innocence Project,  po99 -
lice,  academics,  and attorneys.  The discussion ultimately identified concerns about the 100 101 102
resources required to implement reform, with post-hearing submissions highlighting the need 
for financial and organizational re-structuring of the forensic science sector.  This prompted 103
discussion about the feasibility of reforms,  and to date Congressional efforts to introduce 104
comprehensive legislative reform have faced significant challenges.   Despite this, existing 105
DNA-based initiatives have continued to receive funding. For example, the Debbie Smith Act 
was re-authorized in 2014, providing $968 million over the 2015-2019 period to assist the 
Department of Justice in clearing DNA backlogs.  With the cost of creating and maintaining 106
forensic science standards being a decisive factor, Congress’ ability to enact meaningful sys-
temic reform has been questioned.  107
State Legislatures 
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Prior to Strengthening, numerous states had established bodies with the capacity to provide 
forensic science oversight.  There is evidence to suggest that the messages within Strength108 -
ening have shaped the work of some of these bodies. For example, Texas’s judicial commis-
sion that investigates public complaints about forensic science, has embraced Strengthening’s 
findings as being “at the forefront of the national dialogue on efforts to improve forensic sci-
ence.”   It has also spent time discussing challenges and improvements based on the report’s 109
findings.  In North Carolina, Strengthening, coupled with the findings of the North Carolina 110
Innocence Inquiry Commission about forensic science practices,  has influenced the state 111
legislature to reform forensic science services.  Reforms includes renaming the State Bu112 -
reau of Investigations to formally separate it from law enforcement, following Strengthen-
ing’s recommendations,  and creating a review board to oversee the work of laboratory em113 -
ployees.   114
Judicial Decisions 
Judicial responses to Strengthening are considered in two categories. First, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz.  Second, the general approaches of lower courts to 115
Strengthening. 
Shortly after Strengthening’s publication, the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz 
v Massachusetts relied on the report to acknowledge that “the forensic science system… has 
serious problems that can only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the cur-
rent structure.”  In that case, the court clarified that forensic science analysts are witnesses 116
under the Confrontation Clause, and are therefore required to testify in court and be subject to 
cross-examination.  Although described as a “straightforward application” of precedent by 117
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Justice Scalia,  the decision has subsequently been cited to reverse proceedings where live 118
witnesses have not appeared.  119
A review of lower court case law between 2009 and 2018 shows that Strengthening has been 
cited across over 200 appeal judgments.   Generally, this cohort of cases shows petitioners 120
using Strengthening to support a claim that – due to unreliability - particular forensic science 
evidence is not/should not have been admissible; and that Strengthening constitutes ‘newly 
discovered evidence’ capable of undermining previous outcomes. In responding to these 
claims, the authors have identified, in particular, five general approaches to Strengthening. 
These approaches are outlined below.  
Silence  
Some courts have simply ignored the report. There are several judgments where the report 
has been considered in the dissent, but is absent in the majority decision. For example, the 
majority judgment in Commonwealth v Treiber is silent with regards to Strengthening, but the 
dissenting opinion highlights the need to use Strengthening to address limitations of forensic 
science evidence.  The dissenting opinion in Ex Parte Robbins also made reference to 121
Strengthening, in the absence of its mention in the majority judgment. The report was used to 
demonstrate the disconnect between science and the law, especially in relation to scientific 
research being a process of constant evolution, often misunderstood by legal practitioners.  122
Strengthening as a Definitional Tool  
Courts have used Strengthening as a definitional tool. For instance, Strengthening has been 
cited to provide an authoritative explanation of forensic science techniques, including a defin-
ition of toolmark identification techniques,  an explanation of the ACE-V method used to 123
compare fingerprint evidence,  and to explain the roles of the medical examiner  and the 124 125
autopsy examiner.  126
Strengthening is Insufficient to Undermine Regular Legal Process 
 Id. at 312.118
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Some courts have acknowledged the concerns raised in Strengthening, but have determined 
that those concerns do not fatally undermine relevant evidence because that evidence has 
been subject to regular legal procedures aimed at evaluating the evidence. For instance, 
courts have found the challenged forensic evidence was properly considered by the trial 
judge,  lawyers, and/or jury.  In United States v Herrera, the appeal court discussed the 127 128
judicial approach to fingerprint evidence. In concluding that the judge had properly ap-
proached the evidence, and the evidence “doesn’t have to be infallible to be probative,” the 
petitioner’s claim that Strengthening undermined fingerprint evidence was dismissed.  In 129
Commonwealth v Gambora, for example, the court undertook a lengthy discussion on the 
questions raised by Strengthening about the limitations of fingerprint individualization. They 
found Strengthening’s findings to be “important, and deserv[ing] [of] consideration,”  but 130
ultimately held that defense counsel had – in the process of cross-examination - emphasized 
the lack of individualization sufficiently.  Similarly, in State v Thomas, the appellant argued 131
that Strengthening undermined the firearm evidence presented during his trial.  The court, 132
however, determined that as there had been no plain error, the report’s findings contributed 
towards the weight of the evidence, not admissibility.  133
Strengthening as Support for Limitations on Expert Testimony 
Strengthening has seemingly informed judicial decisions to limit expert firearms testimony.  134
For instance, in United States v Ashburn, the expert’s testimony was curtailed to “a reason-
able degree of certainty in the ballistics field,” as opposed to “a “practical impossibility” that 
any other firearm fired the cartridges in question.”  In making this decision, the court re135 -
viewed firearms identification, weighing AFTE practices and guidelines against the findings 
and recommendations of Strengthening. Following a review of Strengthening, the judge in 
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United States v Taylor also limited the expert’s firearms testimony, to prevent the expert from 
concluding that “there is a match to the exclusion… of all other guns.”   136
Strengthening as ‘Newly Discovered Evidence’ 
Courts have routinely dismissed newly discovered evidence petitions that claim Strengthen-
ing is new evidence. Judges have reasoned that Strengthening does not meet the requirements 
of newly discovered evidence because it is merely a “newly willing source for previously 
known facts.”  In Ross v Epps, for example, the court found Strengthening did not provide 137
any new evidence contradicting what was said at trial i.e., did not have outcome changing 
capacity.  This approach has been taken by number of court decisions examining different 138
forensic science techniques.  139
However, Strengthening has seemingly been influential in successful newly discovered evi-
dence claims relating to microscopic hair analysis. In Commonwealth v Edmiston,  140
Strengthening was used as authority for the notion that there is “no scientific support for the 
use of microscopic hair analysis.”  This approach was cited in Commonwealth v Chmiel, in 141
which Strengthening was referred to as the “tipping point” in rejecting hair analysis 
evidence.  Furthermore, in Commonwealth v Perrot, the court acknowledged that Strength142 -
ening, (combined with the FBI’s review of relevant hair cases) formed a “new consensus on 
the limitations and nature of hair analysis [that] constitutes newly available evidence.”  143
FBI Response 
Notwithstanding the FBI’s review of microscopic hair analysis cases, the FBI has been criti-
cized for its reluctance to modify practice following the publication of Strengthening.  In 144
particular, the FBI’s public objection to Strengthening’s finding that the validity of finger-
printing is unknown,  has led to questions about the FBI’s commitment to forensic science 145
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reform.  For instance, Cole has criticized the FBI for both creating barriers to proficiency 146
testing,  and “grandfathering” longstanding forensic evidence.  This latter practice, it has 147 148
been suggested, has led to forensic science disciplines with long-term admissibility records 
being sheltered from scrutiny.  Giannelli has criticized the actions of the FBI, arguing that 149
their “shaping the research agenda, limiting access to data, attacking experts…, and “spin-
ning” negative reports” is preventing Strengthening from having a meaningful impact.  150
Department of Justice 
Strengthening criticized the Department of Justice (DOJ) for neglecting its role in improving 
forensic science, finding that “the research funding strategies of [the] DOJ have not adequate-
ly served the broad needs of the forensic science community.”  The DOJ has been identified 151
as a stakeholder capable of facilitating meaningful reform,   but its desire to make use of 152
this capacity has been questioned. Giannelli, for example, has accused the DOJ of “sabotag-
ing efforts” to conduct research,  and Lander has confronted the DOJ’s resistance to the 153
need for empirical support for evidence.  Barkow, however, has reasoned that “conflicts 154
have emerged” between the DOJ’s prosecuting role and the need for further research, and 
“when they have, prosecution interests have won out.”   155
That said, the DOJ did act when it became clear that a National Institute of Forensic Science 
would not materialize through an act of Congress.  In 2013., the DOJ collaborated with the 156
National Institute of Standards and Technology to create the National Commission on Foren-
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sic Science (NCFS).  The NCFS was vested in the DOJ,  but designed to fulfil Strength157 158 -
ening’s oversight recommendations.  The creation of the NCFS was welcomed,  and be159 160 -
tween 2013 and 2017 it engaged in a research and reform agenda.  On the expiration of its 161
four-year charter, however, the NCFS was disbanded.  The NCFS reported that further 162
work was necessary to enact reforms.   The NCFS’s short tenure revived concerns about 163
the DOJ’s commitment to improving forensic science being revisited. Former NCFS member, 
Professor Jules Epstein, has evaluated the work of the NCFS, noting that political considera-
tions precluded the commission from truly advancing forensic science, calling efforts “evoca-
tive of Alice in Wonderland…and not conducive to placing scientific validity first.”  The 164
need for an oversight body being able to independently navigate its mission is evidently im-
portant.  
The White House 
As part of broader attempts to improve criminal justice, the Obama Administration reviewed 
Strengthening within a 2016 report by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (PCAST).  The PCAST report supported Strengthening’s findings,  but went 165 166
beyond Strengthening by recommending that judges limit the admissibility of particular dis-
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ciplines.  Despite this, the report’s findings were dismissed by the FBI  and the DOJ,  167 168 169
and rejected completely by the AFTE (Association of Firearm and Tool Mark Examiners), 
who described the report as “lack[ing] in adequate investigation and understanding.”  The 170
PCAST report has been referenced alongside Strengthening by some courts. For example, in 
United States v Bonds, both reports were referenced to argue that fingerprint evidence is not 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted into evidence.  While the court acknowledged PCAST’s 171
findings, the court determined that these concerns should go to the weight of evidence, not 
admissibility.  This decision has since been followed by subsequent courts, who have used 172
Bonds to determine that “the PCAST report presents only advisory recommendations con-
cerning validity,” and that the issue remains one of weight, and therefore a matter for the jury 
to determine.   173
PART II: A TEMPLATE FOR FUTURE REPORTING 
The various stakeholder responses to both the CBLA Report and Strengthening are informa-
tive. They provide guidance on what messages stakeholders have received or acted on from 
the two NAS reports, but also what issues seemingly limit stakeholders in responding com-
prehensively to concerns raised by the reports. Based on the experiences of the CBLA Report 
and Strengthening, Part II presents a template i.e., ideas for the NAS to consider when report-
ing on forensic science. This template is suggested with a view to both enhancing the NAS’ 
impact when reporting, and enabling stakeholders to better harness the expertise of the NAS. 
The template has two parts. The first part – outlined in sub-section (a) - encourages the NAS 
to build on existing stakeholder engagement. The second part – outlined in sub-section (b) - 
encourages the NAS to be more expressly sensitive to the frameworks/cultures within which 
stakeholders operate.  
a. Building on Existing Stakeholder Engagement 
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Part I outlined how the selected NAS reports have attracted stakeholder engagement. This is 
true beyond these two specific reports.  Reflecting on were the NAS reports have already 174
received traction, this subsection suggests four areas where the NAS could target its activity.  
The NAS Reports as Referencing Tools 
Case law consistently demonstrates that the NAS’ reports on forensic science are used by 
judges as a reference tool. As explored in Part I, this is true of Strengthening.  The CBLA 175
Report has also been used by judges as a referencing tool, such as in United States v Berry, 
where the CBLA Report was used to consider how CBLA matches are declared, and an ex-
cerpt from the report was quote to provide information about variations in reliability of 
CBLA, as manufacturing processes are not taken into account during analysis.  This is also 176
the case beyond these two reports. For example, judges have used DNA Technology in Foren-
sic Science (1992) and The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996) as an authoritative 
definition of how DNA evidence is extracted and analyzed.  These two reports have also 177
been referenced for their explanations of statistical calculations as to the significance of a 
DNA match.  178
This reliance on the authority of NAS reports to provide information about forensic science 
techniques suggests that courts see the NAS as a scientific authority, independent of parties to 
the trial process. To this end, the authors suggest that the NAS could maximize the impact of 
its reporting in this way. One suggestion for doing this is for the NAS to create a living doc-
ument (reflecting that this information may change in line with the nature of scientific in-
quiry) on forensic science techniques. Such a document could include a definition of all ex-
amined forensic science techniques, information about methods of identification and analysis, 
and a summary of limitations. Through the NAS collating existing forensic science defini-
tions, legal actors benefit from a single-source material, which will provide an independent 
and authoritative definition of forensic science techniques. 
Targeting Trending Issues 
Part I highlights that the selected reports have played a role in shaping conversations around 
trending issues in forensic science. For example, albeit resisted at first by the FBI, the CBLA 
Report ultimately kick-started changes in FBI practices, with the FBI recognizing action was 
 There exists much legal academic literature discussing stakeholders’ engagement with the six forensic science NAS re174 -
ports. The authors undertook a review of each, and found 278 references for DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992), 
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Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence (2004), 34 for Ballistic Imaging (2008), and 391 for Strengthening Forensic Sci-
ence in the United States: A Path Forward (2009).
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needed.  Further, Strengthening has evidently informed legal claims surrounding the relia179 -
bility of several forensic disciplines.  Noting this, it is suggested that the NAS continues to 180
proactively identify issues in forensic science that are receiving increased stakeholder scru-
tiny. For example, the NAS could target reporting on what steps might follow the FBI’s col-
laborative review of microscopic hair analysis,  and/or further investigate trends in judicial 181
decision-making as they relate to contentious forensic science evidence. In relation to the lat-
ter, for instance, there is a notable pattern in judicial decision-making with regards to the 
phraseology of expert testimony provided by firearm examiners.  The authors suggest that 182
the NAS could target reporting on these trending issues, in order to maximize their impact 
and assist stakeholders as they attempt to address uncertainties.  
This proactive approach would be in line with the NAS’ history of taking initiative to explore 
pressing issues, which contribute to enabling stakeholders to resolve uncertainty. This in-
cludes issues relating to criminal justice. For instance, the 1992 report - DNA Technology in 
Forensic Science – was born from a series of conversations between the FBI and the National 
Research Council in 1988.  In the light that the FBI could not provide sufficient funds to 183
investigate the DNA-related issues, the NAS reached out to private and state bodies for 
funds. The NAS was successful in obtaining $310,000,  and initiated the study in January 184
1990.  185
State Level Engagement 
Although the CBLA and Strengthening reports were commissioned by federal entities, their 
outcomes have been harnessed by state-based institutions to bring about change at state level. 
As discussed in Part I, Strengthening has been used by the Texan legislature to underpin 
broader criminal justice reforms, and also in North Carolina. State courts have also harnessed 
NAS reports to inform their decision making. Several state courts have used the CBLA Report 
to support decisions to overturn convictions, including the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Clemons v State,  and the Superior Court of New Jersey in State v Behn.  Again, this state-186 187
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level impact is evident beyond these two reports. For instance, judges in California have used 
DNA Technology in Forensic Science and The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence to in-
form their evolving approach to DNA evidence in criminal cases.   188
This state-level traction suggests that federally commissioned and directed NAS reports can 
have a significant impact at state level. States can be considered more receptive and/or able to 
deliver reform. Reflecting on this, and the fact that the NAS’ mandate does not expressly pre-
clude them from receiving requests about and/or focusing on state-specific issues, the authors 
suggest the NAS could develop a state-specific portfolio, targeting issues of specific concern 
to individual states or groups of states.  
Taking Forward National Efforts 
Albeit challenging, there have been national efforts to address concerns about forensic sci-
ence. The National Commission for Forensic Science (NCFS), and the 2016 President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) report emerged from observations 
set out in Strengthening. As explored in Part I, the NCFS was disbanded in 2017, and the 
2016 PCAST report has had a critical response and somewhat nuanced impact.  Some have 189
considered this disappointing. For example, Judge Konzinski expressed his dissatisfaction 
following the PCAST report, showing disappointment at the “swiftness with which the U.S. 
Justice Department and FBI rejected the report on… insubstantial grounds.”  Similarly, Pro190 -
fessor Epstein’s response to the dissolution of the NCFS demonstrates frustration at the limit-
ed impact of the body.  However, the authors suggest that the NAS – as an independent 191
body - could be the appropriate body to re-energize these efforts, building on the foundations 
laid by the NCFS and PCAST, and using its expertise in bringing together multi-stakeholders 
to advance existing ideas.   192
b) Sensitivity to the Frameworks within which Stakeholders Operate 
A key element to building on existing stakeholders engagement effectively would be to do so 
in a way that is expressly sensitive to the frameworks that stakeholders operate within. A va-
riety of stakeholders – ranging from the FBI and DOJ, to the courts and Congress – have en-
 In California, the 1992 case of People v. Barney (8 Cal.App.4th 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)) became the leading case for 188
determining the admissibility of DNA evidence using the ceiling principle under the Kelly admissibility standard, with sub-
sequent cases using Barney as a starting point whilst incorporating technological developments. For example, People v. 
Venegas (18 Cal.4th 47 (Cal. 1998)) confirmed the admissibility of the product rule of statistical calculations following the 
publication of The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996) and People v. Reeves (91 Cal.App.4th 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001)) further developed DNA case law by holding that the product rule can be used when the DNA is analyzed using the 
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gaged with the CBLA Report and Strengthening.  In preparing and publishing its reports, the 
NAS demonstrates an appreciation for its audiences and an awareness of consequences for 
stakeholders beyond their commissioning bodies. The same can be said for in relation to 
NAS’ other forensic science reports.  Part I demonstrates, however, that each stakeholder 193
can be limited in their response by their own institutional frameworks and culture.  
This point can be teased out across various examples, with individual stakeholders demon-
strating particular concerns. Congress and the FBI are expressly cognizant of resource impli-
cations. Congressional committees have addressed funding and resource issues several times. 
For example, the House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology has ex-
pressed concern about a congressional focus on funding around DNA evidence to the detri-
ment of non-DNA evidence.  The FBI justified its discontinuation of CBLA by considering 194
“the costs of maintaining the equipment [and] the resources necessary to do the 
examination”  Further, the FBI and DOJ are clearly placed in a difficult position when pre195 -
sented with reporting that undermines their institutional practices, particularly those that have 
been in use for a long time. Moreover, they both demonstrate a preference for remedying 
problems from the inside out. For example, following the publication of the CBLA Report, 
the FBI initiated an internal examination of the technique before discontinuing the practice in 
September 2005. Moreover, by creating the National Commission on Forensic Science within 
the DOJ, the DOJ was able to first look internally at its practices. Judicial decision-making, 
on the other hand, is naturally informed by the legal process vision i.e., guided by such con-
cerns as the need finality, and to make decisions that give deference to institutional compe-
tences, such as the designated roles of judges, lawyers, and jurors. This is evidenced in deci-
sions including Commonwealth v Joyner,  Commonwealth v Fisher,  and State v 196 197
Romero.  The courts and its actors can also be hindered in interpreting science reports due 198
to a lack of in-house scientific expertise.  Moreover, all stakeholders are vulnerable to the 199
political climate of the day.  
 DNA Technology in Forensic Science, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, and Ballistic Imaging have each re193 -
ceived considerable citations in case law. Over the period 1992-2017, the authors have identified 213, 183, and 32 citations 
respectively. 
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These observations are not surprising. They reflect the very nature of the functions that these 
stakeholders perform. Common to them all, however, is a concern about maintaining public 
confidence in the criminal justice system, as each of them play a role in that maintenance. 
The NAS reports - through reflecting progression in scientific thought and/or a new presenta-
tion of existing knowledge, naturally have the potential to destabilize public confidence. In-
deed, stakeholders have expressly recognized this.   200
With this in mind, the authors’ final suggestion is that the NAS – building on its current prac-
tices - more expressly shapes its reporting to account for the concerns of its primary audi-
ences.  This is not a call for the NAS to change the substance of the messages it reports, but 201
rather a suggestion that it takes action to acknowledge more expressly the concerns of its au-
dience(s). For example, the NAS could, within its reports: 
a. set out resources/costings options;  
b. generate bite-sized steps to reform that can have a phased implementation (including 
short, medium, and long-term plans);  
c. set out actions that stakeholders can take internally to further investigate or remedy 
deficiencies and initiate reforms reported on; 
d. set out actions that stakeholders can undertake collectively or collaboratively; and  
e. provide express points of reference for stakeholders (e.g. suggestions for findings of 
judicial notice; novel findings; and/or points in time at which scientific consensus 
could be deemed to exist).  
As part of this, the NAS can take a lead role in (1) facilitating cross-stakeholder collabora-
tion; and (2) normalizing and explaining the nature of the scientific method, progress, find-
ings, and uncertainty.  
The latter practice is, in particular, crucial. This is because many stakeholders are under-
standably nervous about taking actions that would undermine public confidence in the crimi-
nal justice system’s actors, processes, and institutions (by, for example, declaring a long-time 
used forensic science identification method to be unreliable or, from a court’s perspective, 
inadmissible). Law shapes the criminal justice system, and law is known for being sceptical 
about change, preferring to take approaches that achieve finality, predictability and pro-
 See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Criminal Law’s Science Lag: How Criminal Justice Meets Changed Scientific Understand200 -
ing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1751 (2015), which provides examples of stakeholders’ responses to several events having the potential 
to undermine public confidence in forensic science relied upon by these bodies. It assesses stakeholders’ responses in reduc-
ing the uncertainty caused, and their efforts to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system’s reliance on foren-
sic science evidence. 
 It is evident that the NAS does take into account the context within which its reports are situated. One such example is in 201
Strengthening where the report discussed issues with the Daubert framework. (HARRY T. EDWARDS, CONSTANTINE GATSO-
NIS ET AL, supra note 9, at 110). The authors suggest that these links should be made stronger.
cedural regularity.  By contrast, science generally “embraces change.”  The products of 202 203
the scientific method are widely understood to be provisional: hypotheses are routinely re-
vised or abandoned and replaced by new dominant theories. This methodology “motivates 
more and more scientific study, and is thus vital to the scientific enterprise.”  The NAS’ 204
forensic science reports embody this culture of science, reflecting a culture of collaboration 
and inquiry.  As such, the NAS – through its reporting - can (continue to) play an important 205
role in educating stakeholders and the wider public about the scientific method, including the 
normalcy of provisional findings and uncertainty. This is aligned with the NAS’ role to pro-
vide independent, unbiased, and scientifically robust evidence that can inform sound public 
policy,  and its mission to “encourage education and research… [and] increase public un206 -
derstanding in matters of science….”  207
CONCLUSION 
The National Academy of Sciences is the United States’ leading science and technology 
think-tank, with an active commitment to “provide scientific advice to the government when-
ever called upon.”  It has a mission to provide “independent, objective advice to the nation 208
on matters related to science and technology”, and to “encourage education and research… 
increase public understanding in matters of science….”    209
Over the last 150 years, the NAS has generated a diverse and important portfolio of research, 
including six reports commenting on the status of forensic science evidence in the USA, 
namely DNA Technology in Forensic Science (1992), The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evi-
dence (1996), The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003), Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet 
Lead Evidence (2004), Ballistic Imaging (2008), and Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward (2009). These reports were fueled by growing concerns about 
particular forensic science disciplines (and specifically their application in legal proceedings). 
The response of stakeholders – including the FBI, Department of Justice, Congress, the judi-
ciary, state legislatures, and the White House- to these reports has varied. Using the different 
experiences of two reports - Forensic Analysis: Weighing Bullet Lead Evidence (2004) and 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (2009) - as a vehicle, 
 Sarah Lucy Cooper, Forensic Science Identification Evidence: Tensions Between Law and Science, 16 J. PHIL SCI. & L. 202
1, 4 (2016).
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this article has suggested a template for how the NAS can strengthen the impact of its foren-
sic science reporting, which will enable stakeholders to better harness the unique expertise of 
the NAS.  
This two-part template first encourages the NAS to build on existing stakeholder engagement 
with its forensic science reporting. This includes developing referencing tools; targeting 
trending issues; engaging directly with states; and progressing existing national efforts. Sec-
ond, the template encourages the NAS to be more expressly sensitive to the frameworks/cul-
tures within which stakeholders operate. This may include reports setting out resources/cost-
ings options; bite-sized and phased reform plans; ideas for internal actions and external col-
laborations; and providing express points of reference.  These suggestions will enable to the 
NAS to take a lead role in (1) facilitating cross-stakeholder collaboration; and (2) normaliz-
ing and explaining the nature of the scientific method, progress, findings, and uncertainty, so 
as to support stakeholders to maintain public confidence in the criminal justice system. This 
role aligns neatly with the NAS’ unique history, function, and mission. 
